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Restrictions on Attorneys' Extrajudicial Comments on
Pending Litigation-The Constitutionality of Dis-
ciplinary Rule 7-107: Hirschkop v. Snead
I. INTRODUCTION
Disciplinary Rule 7-107 (DR 7-107) of the American Bar Associa-
tion's (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility restricts attorneys' ex-
trajudicial comments about cases with which they are associated.' The
ABA Code, which consists of canons, ethical considerations, and disciplin-
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 7-107 [hereinafter cited as
DR 7-107]:
(A) A lawyer participating in or associated with the investigation of a criminal matter shall
not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would
expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that does more than state
without elaboration:
(1) Information contained in public record.
(2) That the investigation is in progress.
(3) The general scope of the investigation including a description of the offense and, if
permitted by law, the identity of the victim.
(4) A request for assistance in apprehending a suspect or assistance in other matters and
the information necessary thereto.
(5) A warning to the public of any dangers.
(B) A lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter
shall not, from the time of the filing of the complaint, information, or indictment, the issuance
of an arrest warrant, or arrest until the commencement of the trial or disposition without
trial, make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person
would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to:
(I) The character, reputation, or prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments, or
other charges of crime) of the accused.
(2) The possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged or to a lesser offense.
(3) The existence or contents of any confession, admission, or statement given by the
accused or his refusal or failure to make a statement.
(4) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of the
accused to submit to examinations or tests.
(5) The identity, testimony, or credibility of a prospective witness.
(6) Any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the evidence, or the merits of
the case.
(C) DR 7-107 (B) does not preclude a lawyer during such period from announcing:
(1) The name, age, residence, occupation, and family status of the accused.
(2) If the accused has not been apprehended, any information necessary to aid in his
apprehension or to warn the public of any dangers he may present.
(3) A request for assistance in obtaining evidence.
(4) The identity of the victim of the crime.
(5) The fact, time, and place of arrest, resistance, pursuit, and use of weapons.
(6) The identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the length of the
investigation.
(7) At the time of seizure, a description of the physical evidence seized, other than a
confession, admission, or statement.
(8) The nature, substance, or text of the charge.
(9) Quotations from or references to public records of the court in the case.
(10) The scheduling or result of any step in the judicial proceedings.
(11) That the accused denies the charges made against him.
(D) During the selection of a jury or the trial of a criminal matter, a lawyer or law firm
associated with the prosecution or defense of a criminal matter shall not make or participate
in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be
disseminated by means of public communication and that relates to the trial, parties, or issues
in the trial or other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial, except that
he may quote from or refer without comment to public records of the court in the case.
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ary rules, is a model for jurisdictions to adopt if desired. When the rules
are adopted in a jurisdiction, a lawyer's conduct cannot fall below the
standard set by the rules without the lawyer being subject to disciplinary
action. Most jurisdictions have adopted DR 7-107, and in those jurisdic-
tions it has the binding effect of law.2
Adoption of the rules by the Supreme Court of Virginia 3 rendered
attorneys practicing in that state subject to the trial publicity restrictions of
DR 7-107. From 1965 to 1975, Philip J. Hirschkop, an attorney involved in
many "unpopular" civil liberties and civil rights cases, was the subject of
half of the complaints filed with the Virginia State Bar Association
charging violations of DR 7-107. One complaint was filed after he told the
press that he was representing an indicted prison official because the
official was "a good guy." In settling Hirschkop's suit against it for
discriminatory application of the rule, the State Bar agreed the complaints
against him were meritless. Still, Hirschkop brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of DR 7-107.4
(E) After the completion of the trial or disposition without trial of a criminal matter and
prior to the imposition of sentence, a lawyer or law firm associated with the prosecution or
defense shall not make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable
person would expect to be disseminated by public communication and that is reasonably
likely to affect the imposition of sentence.
(F) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 also apply to professional disciplinary
proceedings and juvenile disciplinary proceedings when pertinent and consistent with other
law applicable to such proceedings.
(G) A lawyer or law firm associated with a civil action shall not during its investigation or
litigation make or participate in making an extrajudicial statement, other than a quotation
from or reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated
by means of public communication and that relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospective
witness.
(3) The performance or results of any examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of a
party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims or defenses of a party, except as required by
law or administrative rule.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial of the action.
(H) During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer or law firm associated
therewith shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a quotation from or
reference to public records, that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by
means of public communication if it is made outside the officialcourse of the proceeding and
relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party, witness, or prospective
witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any examinations or tests or the
refusal or failure of a party to submit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or positions of an interested
person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing.
(I) The foregoing provisions of DR 7-107 do not preclude a lawyer from replying to
charges of misconduct publicly made against him or from participating in the proceedings of
legislative, administrative, or other investigative bodies.
(J) A lawyer shall exercise reasonable care to prevent his employees and associates from
making an extrajudicial statement that he would be prohibited from making under DR 7-107.
2. See note 27 infra.
3. See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
4. 594 F.2d at 362. See text accompanying notes 62-66 infra.
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The issue had been previously decided, by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, on the complaint of a group of Chicago attorneys. In Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer,5 the Seventh Circuit held that the rule was
unconstitutional, determining that a "serious and imminent threat" to a
fair trial was necessary before attorneys' comments could be proscribed.
In Hirschkop v. Snead, however, the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc,
disagreed with the Seventh Circuit on several counts. Most notably, the
Fourth Circuit held that the "reasonable likelihood" standard presently
prescribed by the rule is constitutionally adequate.6
In the four years between these two decisions, a committee of the ABA
(the Goodwin Committee) reviewed DR 7-107 and recommended that
several substantial changes be made to the rules. Later, in the draft of the
new model rules, issued after the Hirschkop decision, the Kutak
Commission included some of the changes recommended by the Goodwin
Committee.7 As a result of the two court of appeals decisions and the
ABA's recommended changes, the constitutionality of the present ABA
rule is uncertain.
This Case Comment will examine the development of DR 7-107,
critically analyze the basis of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hirschkop v.
Snead, and discuss the present and future status of DR 7-107 and the
ABA's recommended changes to the rule.
II. HISTORY OF DR 7-107
A. The Birth and Development of Disciplinary Rule 7-107
The conflict between the first amendment's protection of free speech8
and the sixth amendment's protection of a fair trial9 is nearly as old as our
nation.10 The general concern of the courts in this conflict has been to
prevent prejudicial comments from reaching jurors." Over the years,
courts have employed various measures in an effort to prevent such
5. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
6. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 362, 362 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
7. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
8. U.S. CONs. amend. I reads, in part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press."
9. U.S. CONsT. amend VI reads, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed."
10. See Cooper, No Comment Rules: A Delicate Balance of Fundamental Rights, 30 MIAmi L.
REV. 459, 460 n.7 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Cooper] in which the author notes:
The problem of publicity in the administration of criminal justice dates as far back as Aaron
Burr's trial before Chief Justice Marshall in 1809. The defense counsel urged that the jurors
had been prejudiced against Colonel Burr by inflammatory articles carried in the Alexandria
Exposition. See also Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 n. 16 (1941). The Court cited the
statement of Thomas Jefferson wherein he referred to the putrid state to which the press had
declined. "'It is however an evil for which there is no remedy, our liberty depends on the press,
and that cannot be limited without being lost.'"
1I. In Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454,462 (1907), the Court noted: "[T]he conclusions to be
reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influences."
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prejudice: change of venue, sequestration, appeals, cautions to the jury,
and extensive voir dire.'
2
In the 1960's, courts developed the trend of reversing convictions on
appeal whenever it was determined that a fair trial had been prevented due
to prejudicial publicity. 3 In the 1966 Sheppard v. Maxwell decision, 14
however, the Supreme Court, reversing the conviction of Dr. Sam
Sheppard for the murder of his wife because prejudicial publicity had
denied him his right to a fair trial, recognized that reversals did not
effectively combat the prejudicial publicity problem. The Court laid down
the following mandate:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news
comment on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process
requires that the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside
influences. Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the
difficulty of effacing prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the
trial courts must take strong measures to ensure that the balance is never
weighed against the accused. And appellate tribunals have the duty to make
an independent evaluation of the circumstances.
• . . But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure
lies in those remedial measures that willprevent the prejudice at its inception.
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their
processesfrom prejudicial outside interferences. Neither prosecutors, counsel
for defense, the accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers
coming under the jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its
function. 1"
The Supreme Court's directive in Sheppard v. Maxwell has been
implemented in two ways.16 Some courts have relied upon specific pretrial
orders to restrict comment by participants in pending litigation,17 on a
case-by-case basis. Using a different approach, the ABA and many courts
have adopted "no comment" rules that restrict the release of specific
information by attorneys involved in pending litigation. These "no-
comment" rules have evolved from the findings of several studies
conducted in efforts to satisfy the Sheppard mandate. The scope and
results of these studies will now be considered.
The concern with attorney comment as it relates to the free press-fair
trial issue is not new. Canon 20 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics
12. Cooper, supra note 10, at 461.
13. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (prejudicial and inflammatory publicity denied
defendant fair trial and due process); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965) (televising criminal
proceedings held to be inherently prejudicial); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (venue not
changed when an interview in which defendant confessed to the crime had been televised repeatedly);
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (trial court failed to grant a second change of venue when
confronted with inflammatory and prejudicial publicity).
14. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
15. Id. at 362-63 (emphasis added).
16. See Note, 10 GA. L. REv. 289, 295 (1975).
17. See, e.g., Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
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has long recommended that attorneys "avoid" exparte statements.18 It was
not until 1968, however, that the Reardon Report, following the Sheppard
mandate, recommended that specific disciplinary rules be adopted by the
ABA and the courts. 9 Spurred by the Warren Commission's urging that
efforts be made to balance the fair trial and free press considerations, 0 the
ABA's Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press (the Reardon
Committee) had been formed prior to the Sheppard decision to study the
problems. After considering the issues in light of the decision in Sheppard,
the Reardon Committee recommended standards aimed at preventing
prejudicial publicity in criminal proceedings.2' Recognizing that the
prosecution or defense attorney who releases information to the news
media about the defendant and the trial is one of the chief sources of
prejudicial publicity in a criminal case,22 the Reardon Report recommend-
ed prohibiting release by counsel of information or opinions in connection
with pending criminal litigation if there is a "reasonable likelihood" that
such comment might interfere with a fair trial or otherwise prejudice the
due administration of justice.23
The Judicial Conference of the United States also examined the free
press-fair trial issue following the Sheppard decision. The Judicial
Conference assigned to its Committee on the Operation of the Jury System
(the Kaufman Committee) the task of studying "the necessity of
promulgating guidlines [sic] or taking other corrective action to shield
federal juries from prejudicial publicity in light of the Supreme Court's
18. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 20 [hereinafter cited as CANON 20] provides:
Newspaper publications by a lawyer as to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere
with a fair trial in the Courts and otherwise prejudice the due administration of justice.
Generally, they are to be condemned. If the extreme circumstances of a particular case justify
a statement to the public, it is unprofessional to make it anonymously. An exparte reference
to the facts should not go beyond quotation from the records and papers on file in the court,
but even in extreme cases it is better to avoid any ex parte statement.
As early as 1915, Judge Orrin N. Carter of the Supreme Court of Illinois wrote:
[Ilt is fitting to call attention to publications in the newspapers by counsel as to pending
litigation. The canons of ethics are right in saying that such publications may interfere with a
fair trial of the case, and prejudice with due administration of justice. The difficulty of
selecting an unprejudiced jury is only found in this country in cases that have attracted great
public attention. The troubles in this regard should not be accentuated by members of the
legal profession.
0. CARTER, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 71 (1915).
19. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS (Approved
Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as REARDON REPORT].
20. Id. at 19. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F.
KENNEDY 242 (1964) [the Warren Commission] found that a fair and impartial trial would not have
been possible for Lee Harvey Oswald due to the massive amount of publicity.
21. REARDON REPORT, supra note 19, at 1. See also Scheurich, The Attorney "No Comment"
Rules and the First Amendment, 21 ARIZ. L. REv. 61, 63 (1979).
22. REARDON REPORT, supra note 19, at 76-77. The Reardon Committee also concluded, at this
point, that Canon 20 is too general and has never been enforced; thus, the Committee looked to specific
rules both to clarify the standards of conduct and to provide a means of enforcement for such
standards.
23. Id. at 84-85. See also Hicks, Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer: Gag Rules-The First
Amendment vs. the Sixth, 30 S.W.L.J. 507, 509 (1976).
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recent decision in Sheppard v. Maxwell.,24 The Kaufman Committee
recommended, in substance, the adoption of the Reardon Committee's
proposed rules, 25 opining that "each United States District Court has the
power and the duty to control the release of prejudicial information by
attorneys who are members of the bar of that court" and recommending
"action by local rule to restrict the release of such information on penalty
of disciplinary action.,
26
The guidelines drawn by the Reardon Committee and approved by
the Kaufman Committee were adopted by the ABA and, subsequently, by
many courts27 as the substantial portion of DR 7-107.28
B. Pre-Hirschkop Constitutional Challenge to DR 7-107 in Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer
The first challenge to DR 7-107, by an association of local lawyers in
1975, was decided by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago
Council of Lawyers v. Bauer.29 Finding the "reasonable likelihood"
standard overbroad and thus constitutionally infirm, the Seventh Circuit
held that a "narrower and more restrictive" standard should apply.30 The
court determined that the standard formulated in Chase v. Robson3 and
reaffirmed by In Re Oliver,32 two Seventh Circuit decisions, should apply,
stating that "[o]nly those comments that pose a 'serious and imminent
24. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE OPERATION OF THE JURY SYSTEM ON THE "FREE PRESS-
FAIR TRIAL" ISSUE, 45 F.R.D. 391, 392 (1968) [hereinafter cited as KAUFMAN REPORT].
25. Id. at 407:
The Committee is recommending the adoption in substance of the proposed Canon as it
appears in Section 1.1 of the Proposed Final Draft of the Reardon Report. In the interest of
establishing a uniform standard of conduct for attorneys in criminal cases in both the state
and the federal courts throughout the country, the Committee feels that there is merit in
adopting in substance the formulation proposed to be included in the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility.
26. Id. at 401.
27. G. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 19 (1978): "The . . . [disciplinary
rules] consist of imperatives formulated in the form of administrative regulations and were designed for
adoption by appropriate legal authority with the binding effect of the law. The Code indeed has been so
adopted, sometimes with amendments, in most of the states."
Specifically, DR 7-107 was adopted by the Supreme Court of Virginia and was challenged in
Hirschkop. Rule 1.07 of the Northern District Court of Illinois' Local Criminal Rules, challenged in
Bauer, also implemented the "reasonable likelihood" standard.
28. Reardon, The Fair Trial-Free Press Standards, 54 A.B.A.J. 343 (1968).
29. 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
30. Id. at 249.
31. 435 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). In Chase, the Seventh Circuit found a gag order issued by the
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to be unconstitutional, holding that "[B]efore a trial
court can limit defendants' and their attorneys' exercise of first amendment rights of freedom of speech,
the record must contain sufficient specific findings by the trial court establishing that defendants' and
their attorneys' conduct is 'a serious and imminent threat to the administration ofjustice." "Id. at 1061,
citing Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
32. 452 F.2d Il1 (7th Cir. 1971). In Oliver, the court rejected as unconstitutional a policy
adopted by the district court that contained a blanket prohibition against all extrajudicial comment by
counsel in all pending cases.
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threat' of interference with the fair administration of justice can be
constitutionally proscribed."33
The court thus decided that the "serious and imminent threat"
standard must be an element of any prohibition.34 It further determined
that specific disciplinary rules incorporating that standard would still be
necessary to avoid vagueness, 35 but placed the burden of proof on the
defendant. The court reasoned:
We think that it is proper to formulate rules which would declare that
comment concerning certain matters will presumptively be deemed a serious
and imminent threat to the fair administration of justice so as to justify a
prohibition against them. One charged with violating such a rule would of
course have the opportunity to prove that his statement was not one that
posed such a serious and imminent threat, but the burden would be upon
him.36
Examining the specific provisions of DR 7-107 in this light, the court
found two provisions of the rule that would not be constitutional even if
the serious and imminent threat standard were incorporated. First, DR 7-
107(A),37 which proscribes comments relative to criminal matters during
the investigative stages before arrest or indictment, cannot be con-
stitutionally applied to defense attorneys under the Chicago Council of
Lawyers decision. The Seventh Circuit determined that, because great
discretion is lodged in the prosecutor during the investigatory state,
attorneys representing those parties subject to investigation should be able
to inform the public of the existence of such proceedings-the political
process being an important check on the prosecutor's abuse of his
discretion. 38 Second, DR 7-107(G), 39 which applies no-comment rules to
attorneys involved in civil actions, was found "constitutionally imper-
missible if deemed presumptively prohibited." The court based this
determination on the distinction drawn between civil and criminal
litigation: the greater value placed on impartiality in criminal than in civil
proceedings, the usually greater length of civil trials, the broader discovery
allowed by the civil rules, and the nature of civil trials being such that
important social issues may be involved.40
The plaintiffs in Chicago Council of Lawyers also contended that the
33. 522 F.2d at 249.
34. Id. at 251.
35. Id. at 250.
36. Id. at 251.
37. See note 1 supra.
38. 522 F.2d at 253. The court found DR 7-107 (A) to be"too vague in terms of its application to
attorneys other than those involved on behalf of the Government" and "too broad for the benefit that
may be derived."
39. See note I supra.
40. 522 F.2d at 258. The social benefit of allowing "uninhibited comment by knowledgeable
attorneys involved in civil litigation" was stressed by the court. Id. at 259.
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restrictions should not apply to cases in which the jury is sequestered or the
bench is the trier of fact. The Seventh Circuit rejected these arguments,
reasoning that an unedited newspaper or broadcast might reach a
sequestered jury4 1 and that "judges are human" and may be influenced by
inadmissible outside information.42
Thus, the Seventh Circuit rejected the "reasonable likelihood"
standard, approved the presumptive use of categories of restrictions on
attorneys' comments so long as the "serious and imminent threat"
standard is incorporated, rejected the presumption as it applies to defense
attorneys in the investigative stage and to civil proceedings, and approved
the application of a revised no-comment rule to criminal trials tried by the
bench or by a sequestered jury.
C. The Post-Chicago Council of Lawyers and Pre-Hirschkop Proposed
Revision of DR 7-107 by the ABA's Goodwin Committee
In response to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Council of
Lawyers and the commentary that ensued, the ABA's Standing Committee
on Association Standards for Criminal Justice assigned to a Task Force on
Fair Trial and Free Press the job of re-evaluating the attorney comment
standards.43 This Task Force (the Goodwin Committee) recommended
substantial amendment to the present no-comment rules dealing with
criminal proceedings, primarily by replacing the "reasonable likelihood"
standard with the "clear and present danger" standard: "A lawyer shall not
release or authorize the release of information or opinion for dissemina-
tion by any means of public communication if such dissemination would
pose a clear and present danger to the fairness of the trial.,44 Classifying
extrajudicial public comment about criminal proceedings as "pure
speech," the Committee determined that such comment "enjoys the
strongest possible presumption of first amendment protection. '45 As a
result, the Committee concluded that, to be constitutional, sanctions on
public comment by attorneys must pass the four-step analysis reaffirmed
in 1978 by the United States Supreme Court in Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia:
46
(1) Does the restriction advance a legitimate governmental interest? (2) Does
the public comment pose an extremely serious threat to the governmental
interest sought to be protected? (3) Does that threat appear likely to occur
imminently? (4) Is the restriction on public comment necessary to secure the
protection or advancement of the governmental interest in jeopardy?47
41. Id. at 256.
42. Id. at 256-257, citing Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
43. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL
AND FREE PRESS I (2d Tent. Draft 1978) [hereinafter cited as GOODWIN REPORT].
44. Id. at I (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 2.
46. 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).
47. GOODWIN REPORT, supra note 43, at 3. In Landmark Communications, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed earlier decisions that applied the clear and present danger test to the use of the contempt
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The Goodwin Committee, comparing the standard promulgated in their
proposed amended rules and that promulgated by the court in Chicago
Council of Lawyers, found:
As a first amendment formulation . . . the serious and imminent threat
standard is substantively indistinguishable from clear and present danger.
Indeed, the serious and imminent threat language appears to have been used
first in Bridges v. California. . . .The Court's purpose there was to
articulate the "working principle" on which the clear and present danger
standard was based. Thus, the serious and imminent threat terminology was
and is a part of the judicial gloss on the clear and present danger test and is not
distinct from it. In view of the apparent choice between equivalents, the clear
and present danger language has been retained in this standard.48
Although the proposed rules follow Chicago Council of Lawyers by
adopting a stricter standard, they do not embrace the use of presumptive
restrictions embodied in that case and the original rule. The original rule
sets out a scheme of statements that were prohibited per se.49 In Chicago
Council of Lawyers, the Seventh Circuit held that per se prohibitions were
permissible only if they incorporated the serious and imminent threat
test.50 The Goodwin Committee, however, abandoned the scheme of per se
prohibitions in favor of case-by-case adjudication under the clear and
present danger" restriction, "permitting disciplinary action against the
comment 5' that are designed to further limit the scope of the "clear and
present danger" restriction, " permitting disciplinary action against the
attorney only when an extrajudicial statement meets the requirements of
clear and present danger and, in addition, relates to one of the six
enumerated categories of information about a criminal matter."5 2 This
modification is explained by the Committee as "the major departure from
the first edition":
power to punish out-of-court comments. See, e.g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962); Craig v.
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946): Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252 (1941).
48. GOODWIN REPORT, supra note 43, at 3 (citation omitted).
49. See note I supra.
50. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
51. Paragraph (b) of Standard 8-1.1 of the Goodwin Report reads:
(b) Subject to paragraph (a) [if such dissemination would pose a clear and present
danger to the fairness of the trial], from the commencement of the investigation ofa criminal
matter until the completion of trial or disposition without trial, a lawyer may be subject to
disciplinary action with respect to extrajudicial statements concerning the following matters:
(i) the prior criminal record (including arrests, indictments, or other charges of crime),
the character or reputation of the accused, or any opinion as to the accused's guilt or
innocence or as to the merits of the case or the evidence in the case;
(ii) the existence or contents of [a] statement given by the accused, or the refusal or
failure of the accused to make any statement;
(iii) the performance of any examinations or tests, or the accused's refusal or failure to
submit to an examination or test;
(iv) the identity, testimony, or credibility of prospective witnesses;
(v) the possibility of a plea of guilty to the offense charged, or other disposition; and
(vi) information which the lawyer knows or has reason to know would be inadmissible
as evidence in a trial.
GOODWIN REPORT, supra note 43, at 1.
52. Id. at 4.
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This change reflects the judgment that, while such statements might
undermine trial fairness, it is by no means inevitable. Indeed, in the vast
majority of criminal cases, extrajudicial statements by trial attorneys have no
impact at all. The failure to take full account of this consideration is the
central weakness of the first edition. S3
By defining the "boundaries within which the clear and present danger test
applies," the Committee felt that the problems of overbreadth and
vagueness would be eliminated 4 In addition to the use of presumptions,
the Report also clearly rejects the holding in Chicago Council of Lawyers
that the burden of proof would be on the attorney charged with a violation:
"[t]here is no apparent justification for this allocation, which runs counter
to the general practice of placing the burden of proof on the party charging
a violation to establish each element of the claim."55
These proposed revised rules retain the scope of the original rules,
which apply from the beginning of a criminal investigation through the
sentencing; however, a single standard governs the entire period in these
rules, as opposed to the application of separate standards to the various
phases by the original rules. Also, the Goodwin Committee recommended
that the rules continue to apply to both jury and bench trials, recognizing,
however, that
[a] strong argument can be made for limiting the application of [the proposed
rule] to jury trial cases. The jury is far more vulnerable to the effects of
prejudicial publicity than the trial judge, who by training and experience is
equipped to rule solely on the basis of legally relevant and admissible
evidence.-6
The Goodwin Committee also rejected the Chicago Council of Lawyers
distinction between defense and prosecution attorneys as "impractical,"
recommending that the rules continue to apply to both 7
The House of Delegates of the ABA adopted the final report of the
Goodwin Committee in August of 1978 by voice vote.58 That was the status
of the proposed changes at the time of the Hirschkop decision.59 When
Hirschkop60 reached the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in March of
1979,61 the court was faced with a rule that had its roots in the long-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 4 n.29.
56. Id. at 2 n.3.
57. Id. at 2 & n.4.
58. Scheurich, supra note 21, at 80.
59. Since that time, on January 30, 1980, the ABA's Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards (the Kutak Commission) released the Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, which agrees on several points with the Goodwin Report. Because the draft was released after
the Hirschkop decision, however, it will be examined in this Comment following the discussion and
analysis of Hirschkop. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Discussion Draft 1980) [hereinafter
cited as KUTAK REPORT].
60. 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane).
61. The case was argued before a panel of the Fourth Circuit on October 3, 1978, but the en bane
decision was not handed down until March 2, 1979. 594 F.2d at 356.
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standing fair trial-free press debate, a decision by another circuit court of
appeals that found the rule unconstitutional, and a proposed revision of
the rule by a Committee of the ABA, the very body that promulgated the
original rule.
III. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN Hirschkop v. Snead
A. The Facts and District Court Holding
In 1974, Philip J. Hirschkop, a licensed Virginia attorney, brought
suit against the Virginia State Bar in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division.62 Hirschkop, who
had been involved in many civil rights and civil liberties cases, was the
subject of eleven of the twenty-two complaints filed with the Virginia State
Bar from 1965 to 1975 charging violations of DR 7-107.63 In his original
complaint, Hirschkop claimed that DR 7-107 was unconstitutional both
on its face and in its application. Hirschkop alleged that the rule was
unconstitutionally applied in a "discriminatory pattern of harassment
against [Hirschkop] individually based upon the Bar's disapproval of the
causes [he] espoused. 64 Hirschkop and the Bar reached a settlement,
which was approved by the district court, of the claim regarding the rule's
application. The Bar admitted that the complaints against Hirschkop
"were meritless" and Hirschkop agreed to dismiss his claims against the
State Bar.65 As a result, the only issue presented at trial was the facial
constitutionality of DR 7-107, and the only remaining defendants were the
members of the Supreme Court of Virginia who adopted it.
66
The district court found that the Supreme Court of Virginia had
construed the rule as a general rule explained by specific examples, rather
than as specific proscriptions. The court also found that, as a matter of
logic, the rule applied only to prosecuting attorneys during the
investigatory stage. Based on these findings, the district court determined,
on July 30, 1976, that DR 7-107 is facially constitutional-that the rule is
"a reasonable regulation as to time, manner and place which accordingly
does not suffer from the infirmities of vagueness or overbreadth. 67
Following the district court's decision, Hirschkop brought his appeal to
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
62. Hirschkop v. Virginia State Bar, 421 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd in part andrev'din
part sub nom. Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
63. 594 F.2d at 362.
64. Brief for Appellant at 2, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
65. 594 F.2d at 363.
66. 421 F. Supp. at 1140. The district court opinion was published as Hirschkop v. Virginia State
Bar, although the claims against the State Bar were dismissed pursuant to settlement. The Fourth
Circuit decision properly named the justices of the Virginia Supreme Court as defendants. It should be
noted, however, that Mr. ChiefJustice Snead retired on September 30, 1974, and was succeeded by Mr.
Chief Justice I'Anson, also named as a defendant. Brief for Appellees at 3, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594
F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en bane).
67. 421 F. Supp. at 1156-57.
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B. The Fourth Circuit's Holding and Reasoning
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed in part
and reversed in part the district court's decision. In addition to the court's
per curiam opinion, Judge Phillips filed a concurring opinion, Judges
Winter and Butzner filed an opinion in which they concurred in part and
dissented in part, and Judge Widener filed a separate concurring and
dissenting opinion. 68 The court of appeals held that a "reasonable
likelihood" that the public comment would be prejudicial to the fair
administration of justice was a more appropriate standard than the
"serious and imminent threat" standard. 69 The court, however, limited its
holding to criminal and juvenile jury trials, finding the rule un-
constitutionally overbroad in its application to attorneys associated with
bench trials,70 civil litigation,71 administrative hearings, and disciplinary
hearings.7 3 Certain provisions of the rule were also found to be void for
vagueness.74
1. Application of the Reasonable Likelihood Standard
In examining the standard required by the Constitution, the court
determined that any qualification of the specific restrictions was necessary
only "to take care of the unusual case in which, because of extraordinary
circumstances, there is no likelihood of a prejudicial effect" from release of
information whose dissemination is expressly prohibited by the rules.
75
The court directed its attention in this matter to DR 7-107(B), which
enumerates specific items that may not be released by an attorney
associated with a criminal matter between the stages of the filing of the
complaint and the commencement of the trial.76 The court approved each
of these proscriptions as information the release of which would be so in-
herently prejudicial that it could be proscribed, with qualification. The
court found that, although the prohibitions are not explicitly qualified by
the reasonable likelihood standard, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
strued the prohibitions to be implicitly qualified. The court found it neces-
sary to qualify the rule so that the specific proscriptions would not apply in
the unusual cases in which the release of the specific information would not
be likely to result in prejudice. As an example, the court noted that, should
James Earle Ray escape from prison, it could not be said that the
prosecutor's announcement that Ray had been serving a sentence for the
68. 594 F.2d at 357.
69. Id. at 362.
70. Id. at 371.
71. Id. at 373.
72. Id. at 374.
73. Id. at 372.
74. Id. at 370-71.
75. Id. at 368.
76. See note 1 supra.
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murder of Dr. Martin Luther King would be likely to affect Ray's rights
adversely."7
Regarding the standard imposed by that qualification, the court
upheld the "reasonable likelihood of interference" criterion, finding that
this test "divides the innocuous from the culpable, adds clarity to the rule
and makes it more definite in application. 78 Several reasons were cited for
approving this standard over the stricter tests espoused by the appellant
and adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers79 and
the Goodwin Committee.8" First, the court felt that the rule, with the
"reasonable likelihood of -interference" qualification, very clearly and
definitely informs lawyers of what information they may and may not
make public. It was pointed out that the attorney who releases proscribed
information knows he is threatening the defendant's right to a fair trial;
therefore, the court felt that tribunals should be able to prohibit such
action "without extended controversy over the immediacy and gravity of
the threatened harm in the particular case. 81 Second, the court
distinguished this case from cases, primarily contempt proceedings, in
which the clear and present danger test has been applied. The court found
this case to be "wholly incomparable," the contempt proceedings being
invoked based upon the "vague and general standards" of courts' contempt
power and the disciplinary sanctions being invoked based upon "explicit"
rules.8 2 The court's final justification for the retention of DR 7-107's
standard was the language found in the Sheppard decision:
In Sheppard v. Maxwell the Supreme Court stated that "where there is a
reasonable likelihood the prejudicial news" would prevent a fair trial, the
judge should take remedial action or grant a new trial. The statement was
made with respect to the action the court should take to retrieve the situation
after the harm is done, but the Court, in Sheppard v. Maxwell, also stated
that the court must adopt rules and regulations which avoid the harm in the
first place. If remedial action is required on the basis of a reasonable
likelihood test, and it is, the rules for the avoidance of the harm must be
considered under the same test. Implicitly if not explicitly, the Supreme Court
must have approved the reasonable likelihood standard for the application of
the preventive rules.8
3
Circuit Judges Winter and Butzner, in their concurring and dissenting
opinion, disagreed with the court's approval of the reasonable likelihood
standard. They recommended that all of DR 7-107 be declared un-
constitutional: "To be constitutional, a disciplinary rule must limit its re-
straints on speech to statements that pose a clear and present danger to
77. 594 F.2d at 367-68.
78. Id. at 370.
79. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
80. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
81. 594 F.2d at 368.
82. Id. at 369.
83. Id. at 369-70.
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the fairness of a criminal trial. Rule 7-107 does not satisfy that test.' 'S4
These judges disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the reasonable
likelihood standard was implicitly approved by the Supreme Court in
Sheppard, opining that "it is unlikely that the Court implicitly approved a
shift from the clear and present danger standard . .. to a reasonable
likelihood standard . . . without even commenting on the subject." 85
Cases in which the Supreme Court developed and applied the clear and
present danger standard were examined by the justices,86 who pointed out
that the validity of these cases was recently affirmed in Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia.87 The two judges also emphasized the
prospective nature of the rule in distinguishing their result from the
majority's construction of the language in Sheppard. They pointed out
that when a court applies the reasonable likelihood test to determine
whether the due process clause has been infringed, it views the evidence
retrospectively. Because DR 7-107 operates prospectively, the dissenting
judges observed:
When a lawyer speaks about a pending case, he frequently does not know how
the case will develop, how his remarks will be interpreted and reported, how
much community interest will arise, or what steps the trial judge will take to
avoid prejudice. Therefore, a lawyer can only speculate whether his
comments might later be judged to have created a reasonable likelihood of
prejudice because of contingencies that he might not foresee. Under these
circumstances, the prudent course is to avoid all comment .. . .[L]awyers
must restrict their speech "to that which is unquestionably safe." This
sweeping proscription offends the first amendment.88
These judges added that their position was also supported by the
ABA's proposed revision of DR 7-107, which "served as a prototype for
Virginia's rule."89
2. Limitation of the Rule's Application to Criminal Jury Trials
The court's finding that DR 7-107 is constitutional as it stands was
limited only to those provisions dealing with criminal trials. The portions
of the rule applying to bench trials, civil actions, and disciplinary and
administrative proceedings were rejected as unconstitutionally overbroad.
Having decided early in the opinion that the first part of the two-step test
formulated by the Supreme Court in Procunier v. Martinez" was satisfied
because "courts have a substantial interest in assuring every person the
84. Id. at 379.
85. Id. at 380.
86. Id. at 379-80. The court cited Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); and Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919).
87. 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).
88. 594 F.2d at 380, quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
89. 594 F.2d at 381. See GOODWIN REPORT supra note 43.
90. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
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right to a fair trial," the court applied the second part of the test to
determine whether the restrictions imposed by the rule are overbroad: 91
"Second, the limitation of First Amendment freedoms must be no greater
than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved. 92
a. The Rule is Unnecessarily Overbroad as it Applies to Bench Trials
The court found that DR 7-107's inclusion of bench trials is
unconstitutionally overbroad under the Martinez test because "the gain to
fair bench trials is minimal, and the restriction on first amendment rights is
substantial. 93 To support this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit examined
several factors. The court pointed out that reversals due to prejudicial
publicity have historically occurred in jury trials and that no comments
that a lawyer could make about a pending case had been disclosed that
would "be more prejudicial than the information a judge must consider as
he separates the wheat from the chaff during the course of an ordinary
bench trial., 94 The court thus opined, "when it becomes apparent that the
case is to be tried by a judge alone, we see no compelling reason for
restricting lawyers' comments in order to assure a fair trial."95
Circuit Judge Widener agreed in his concurring and dissenting
opinion with the majority's conclusion that DR 7-107 should not apply to
bench trials; he did not agree, however, with the majority's reasoning in
finding the rule invalid for overbreadth. Troubled by the fact that the same
rule, DR 7-107(B), set aside for overbreadth as it applies to bench trials,
was held valid earlier in the opinion as it applies to jury trials, Judge
Widener concluded, "[t]he reason to invalidate the regulation ...should
be . .. that there is no reasonable likelihood of impairing the integrity of
the trial, not that the regulation does more than do SO.96
b. The Rule is Unnecessarily Overbroad as it Applies to Civil Actions
Disciplinary Rule 7-107(G), which restricts the comments of
attorneys who are associated with civil actions,97 was also determined to be
unconstitutionally overbroad under the Martinez test because the
restrictions of DR 7-107(G) on free speech "are not essential to fair civil
trials. 98 Recognizing that civil litigants must also be assured the right to a
91. 594 F.2d at 363. It should be noted at this point that, in his concurring opinion, Judge
Phillips agreed with both the court's reasoning and result. Judge Phillips felt, however, that an
additional governmental interest should be emphasized: "The state has an interest independent of
individuals' fair trial rights in protecting the integrity of certain essential judicial processes that are
critical in the adversary system." Id. at 376.
92. Id. at 363, quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
93. 594 F.2d at 372.
94. Id. at 371.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 383.
97. See note I supra.
98. 594 F.2d at 373.
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fair trial, the court of appeals nevertheless pointed out several differences
between criminal jury trials and civil trials-differences which led to their
conclusion that the rule should not apply to civil cases. The court
emphasized that civil cases are usually of greater length and often involve
questions of public concern about which public debate can often be
enlightened by timely attorney comment. The court also noted that the
Reardon Committee made no recommendations concerning civil actions,
the court had not been presented with any empirical data showing the need
to restrict attorneys' comments to protect civil actions from prejudice, and
no reversals due to prejudicial publicity were known to have been ordered
in civil trials. Thus, the court based its conclusion on "[t]he dearth of
evidence that lawyers' comments taint civil trials and the courts' ability to
protect confidential information." 99
Judge Widener concurred in the result that DR 7-107(G) should be
struck down as it applies to civil bench trials. He took issue, however, with
the majority's finding that the rule is overbroad, pointing out the
similarities between it and the provisions validated by the court in DR 7-
107(B). Judge Widener stated that the regulation should be invalidated
because the civil bench trial does not need the rule's protection. He
disagreed with the majority's decision that the rule should not apply to civil
jury trials. Finding that "civil jury trials, like criminal, also deserve to be
protected," Widener believed that "no empirical data is needed to show
that if a criminal jury may be influenced a civil jury must similarly be, for
they are the same men and women."'
00
c. The Rule is Unnecessarily Overbroad as It Applies to Disciplinary and
Administrative Proceedings
The court of appeals found the rule overbroad in its application to
disciplinary and administrative proceedings for many of the same reasons
that it cited in finding the rule's provisions relating to bench trials and civil
actions overbroad.
The comments of attorneys associated with professional and juvenile
disciplinary proceedings are restricted by DR 7-107(F). 101 With respect to
professional disciplinary proceedings, the court based its finding of
unconstitutional overbreadth on the same reasoning that it proferred for
finding the provisions relating to bench trials invalid. Implicit in this
conclusion was the court's finding that professional disciplinary
proceedings are rarely tried by juries. 102
Applying that same reasoning to juvenile proceedings, the court held
that when a juvenile is to be tried by a judge, there is "no justification for
99. Id.
100. Id. at 382.
101. See note I supra.
102. 594 F.2d at 372.
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limiting lawyers' comments to insure fairness of the trial.' 0 3 The court,
however, concluded that the rule may be constitutionally applied to jury
trials of juveniles, just as it may be applied to other criminal jury trials. 0 4
Similarly, the court applied the reasoning it had earlier applied to civil
actions to administrative proceedings, comments during which are limited
by DR 7-107(H).10 5 The court found that the state "has not proved that the
limitations on first amendment rights found in Rule 7-107 are essential to
insure the fairness of administrative hearings." Thus, the court held that
DR 7-107(H) does not satisfy the Martinez test and is unconstitutionally
overbroad. The court once again looked to the issues of public concern
often involved in such proceedings, as well as the lack of evidence that any
previous administrative decision had been set aside due to prejudicial
publicity.
10 6
As in the case of the application of the rules to criminal and civil bench
trials, Judge Widener also agreed that DR 7-107(F) and DR 7-107(H)
should be invalidated, but felt that such a result should be reached because
there is no reasonable likelihood of impairing the integrity of the
proceeding, not because those portions of the rule are overbroad. 17
Thus, because the restrictions imposed by several of the provisions-f
DR 7-107 were found to be "greater than is necessary or essential" to the
protection of an individual's right to a fair trial, the following provisions
were held to be unconstitutionally overbroad: DR 7-107(B) as it applies to
bench trials; DR 7-107(G), applying to civil actions; DR 7-107(F) as it
applies to disciplinary proceedings and juvenile bench proceedings; and
DR 7-107(H), applying to administrative proceedings. By process of
elimination, the court approved only the constitutionality of DR 7-107(B)
as it applies to criminal jury trials and DR 7-107(F) as it applies to juvenile
jury proceedings.
3. Certain Provisions of DR 7-107 are Voidfor Vagueness
The court also found that certain provisions of DR 7-107 are
unconstitutional because of vagueness. Vague rules are defined in the
decision as rules that "offend the due process clause because they deny a
'person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.' "10 8 The provisions of the rule
declared to be void for vagueness were DR 7-107(D), (G) (5), (H) (5) and
(E).
Disciplinary Rule 7-107(D) prohibits an attorney associated with a
criminal trial from making any extrajudicial statements that relate to
103. Id. at 372-73.
104. Id. at 372.
105. See note I supra.
106. 594 F.2d at 373-74.
107. Id. at 383.
108. Id. at 370, quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
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"other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere with a fair trial." This
provision also applied to juvenile and disciplinary proceedings by DR 7-
107(F). Similar restrictions are applied by DR 7-107(G) (5) and DR 7-
107(H) (5) to civil and administrative actions, respectively.'0 9 This
proscription was found to be vague in all its applications:
This proscription is so imprecise that it can be a trap for the unwary. It fosters
discipline on a subjective basis depending entirely on what statements the
disciplinary authority believes reasonably endangers [sic] a fair trial. Thus
neither the speaker nor the disciplinarian is instructed where to draw the line
between what is permissible and what is forbidden. 0
Another provision that was declared void for vagueness, for the same
reasons, is DR 7-107(E), which prohibits an attorney from making any
statement "reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence" during
the period between the completion of the criminal trial and the imposition
of the sentence. The court held "the broad proscription of statements that
are 'reasonably likely to affect the imposition of sentence' is void for
vagueness." However, the court also applied the Martinez test to the rule,
reaching the same results it reached with regard to the application of the
rule to jury and bench trials. It was found that limitations could be placed
on attorneys' comments when a jury imposes the sentence, but could not be
placed on comments when the sentence is imposed by a judge."'
Judge Widener also addressed the vagueness issue in his separate
opinion. He concurred that these provisions, DR 7-107(D), (E), (G) (5),
and (H) (5), were all invalid for vagueness. Widener did not agree,
however, that DR 7-107(E) should apply even to criminal jury trials,
stating that he would invalidate that portion of the rule in all cases on
account of vagueness: "Assuming its applicability, however, in some
instances, as the opinion of the court does, then it seems to me that if the
rule is invalid on account of vagueness, as the opinion holds, it should
simply be set aside."'
12
4. Summary of the Fourth Circuit's Holding
In summary, the court upheld the "reasonable likelihood" standard as
a proper qualification of the specific rules. It held, however, that DR 7-107
is constitutional, with the qualifying standard, only as it applies to criminal
and juvenile jury trials. The court rejected the rules applying to bench
trials, civil actions, disciplinary proceedings, juvenile bench proceedings
and administrative proceedings as overbroad. In addition, the provisions
of the rule employing only the general "reasonably likely to interfere"
criterion were found void for vagueness.
109. See note I supra.
110. 594 F.2d at 371. See also id. at 373 for the court's application of this ruling to DR 7-
107(G)(5) and id. at 374 for its application to DR 7-107(H)(5).
I11. Id. at 372.
112. Id. at 383.
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IV. THE STATUS OF DR 7-107
FOLLOWING THE DECISION IN Hirschkop v. Snead-
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S HOLDING
As a result of Hirschkop, the many jurisdictions that have adopted
DR 7-107 in the form recommended by the Reardon Committee are now
confronted with a rule, different portions of which have been struck down
as unconstitutional by two circuit courts of appeal. In addition, should the
ABA adopt the proposed changes to this disciplinary rule, jurisdictions
will also soon be faced with a decision whether to adopt the new rule. Thus,
in light of the Seventh Circuit's decision in Chicago Council of Lawyers
and the ABA's new proposed model rules, both of which conflict on some
points with the Fourth Circuit's holding, it will be necessary for courts in
the future, as they attempt to re-fashion their rules to comport with the
requirements of the Constitution, to examine critically the holding in
Hirschkop and the difficult questions it raises with regard to attorney no-
comment rules.
The constitutionality of applying no-comment rules to attorneys
appears to be firmly established.1 1 3 The questions that must be answered in
analyzing Hirschkop concern the scope and the application of those rules.
A. What Standard, If Any, Should Qualify the Specific
Prohibitions of Attorney No-Comment Rules?
1. May the Rules Impose Per Se or Presumptive Restrictions?
A major point of conflict between authorities who have considered
the question has been the constitutionality of per se or presumptive
restrictions in the rules. The original rules designed by the Reardon
Committee set out a scheme of statements that were prohibited per se.
114
The Seventh Circuit held that specific statements could be presumptively
deemed a serious and imminent threat and shifted the burden of proving
that the statement did not pose such a threat to the defendant-attorney.11 5
The Goodwin Committee rejected the sole use of per se restrictions,
favoring case-by-case adjudication under the clear and present danger test.
A statement could be proscribed only when it posed such a danger and
related to one of the enumerated restrictions. 16 In Hirschkop, the Fourth
Circuit also found that the specific proscriptions had to be qualified to
protect comments specifically prohibited by the rules, but made in those
113. The Supreme Court's mandate in Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), indicating
that courts have both the power and the responsibility to ensure a fair trial, has been extensively quoted
and relied upon. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975);
Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356,365 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc); andKAUMAN REPoRTsupra note24,
at 400.
114. See note 1 supra.
115. See text accompanying notes 34-36 supra.
116. GOODWIN REPORT, supra note 43, at 4.
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unusual cases in which such comments would not be reasonably likely to
interfere with a fair trial.
'1 7
The argument against the use of per se or presumptive restrictions is
persuasive. Although the Fourth Circuit invalidated their use because of
"unusual" cases, it was noted in the Reardon Report that the number of
cases that may actually be prejudiced by attorney comment is relatively
small. Juries try only about eight percent of all criminal cases, a small
portion of which would be subject to prejudicial comments."'
In fact, there may very well be a number of cases in which an
attorney's comment on one of the restricted areas would be highly unlikely
to create prejudice; but, without a qualifying standard by which to judge
such comments, they would be subject to disciplinary action under the
rule's "blanket prohibition," as the Seventh Circuit noted in Chicago
Council of Lawyers:
We do not believe that there can be a blanket prohibition on certain areas of
comment-a per se proscription-without any consideration of whether the
particular statement posed a serious and imminent threat of interference with
a fair trial. Yet these rules establish such a blanket prohibition whereby even a
trivial, totally innocuous statement could be a violation. The First
Amendment does not allow this broad a sweep. 19
The per se prohibitions of the rule result in what one commentator has
termed "unconstitutional 'overkill.' ,,120
The court's decision in Hirschkop against the use of per se
proscriptions is, therefore, in agreement with these other persuasive
authorities that have examined the issue. The specific prohibitions of the
rules should be used as guidelines for case-by-case adjudication
determining whether the comment comes within the specific proscription
and violates the qualifying standard. Once this proposition is accepted by a
court, the court must then consider the proper constitutional qualifying
standard to be applied to the specific prohibited comments.
2. What is the Proper Qualifying Standard?
An examination of Hirschkop and the other authorities that have
addressed this issue will not offer a clear-cut answer regarding the proper
standard to be incorporated in a no-comment rule. The Reardon
Committee and the Fourth Circuit in Hirschkop line up on the side of the
"reasonable likelihood" test. The two dissenting judges in Hirschkop, the
Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers, and the Goodwin
Committee in their proposed new rules have determined that the
Constitution requires a stricter standard-the "serious and imminent
threat" or "clear and present danger" test.
117. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
118. REARDON REPORT, supra note 19, at 22.
119. 522 F.2d at 251.
120. Scheurich, supra note 21, at 79.
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A major difficulty with these decisions is that they have been decided
in a theoretical context and still offer little guidance concerning what
comments would actually be impermissible. Because the courts in these
two cases were only determining the facial constitutionality of DR 7-107,
these decisions offer no examples of comments that would actually violate
the rule. It is still necessary, however, to formulate some standard against
which attorneys may gauge their comments, even though the qualification
cannot possibly provide an absolutely certain answer for every case.
121
In establishing the proper standard, we are guided by the Supreme
Court's holding in Procunier v. Martinez, "[T]he limitation of First
Amendment freedoms must be no greater than is necessary or essential to
the protection of the particular governmental interest involved."',2 2 This
was the test employed by the court in Hirschkop for determining whether
particular restrictions imposed by the rule were overbroad.
123
The court's affirmation of the constitutionality of the reasonable
likelihood test in Hirschkop appears to be based largely upon the Supreme
Court's holding in Sheppard that remedial action should be taken
whenever there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial will be
prejudiced. 124 While relying on an "implicit" assumption garnered from
dicta in that case, the Fourth Circuit also dismissed the long line of
Supreme Court cases that have applied the clear and present danger test as
"incomparable." This conclusion was based on the court's determination
that those Supreme Court cases related to impositions of the contempt
power on the basis of "vague and general standards," while Hirschkop
dealt with "quite explicit" rules, employing a standard "[n]o heavier or
stiffer . .. than .. . is needed."' 125 Such a conclusion appears to be the
result of circular reasoning. The court appears to assert the proposition
that the rules-in which the reasonable likelihood test is implicit126-are
explicit, thus the contempt cases are incomparable and the stricter
standard does not have to be applied. This proposition seems to reduce to
an assertion that a stricter standard does not have to be applied to rules
that employ the reasonable likelihood test.
Whether or not the court's reasoning in dismissing the contempt cases
is faulty, it does not seem that these cases are "incomparable" based on the
distinction between the "explicitness" of the respective restrictions on
speech. Like Hirschkop, the contempt cases concern the competing
considerations of free speech and fair trial and the permissible limitation
that may be placed upon one's first amendment freedoms to protect
121. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972), in which the Court observed:
"Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language."
122. 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974).
123. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
124. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
125. 594 F.2d at 369.
126. Id. at 368.
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another's fair trial freedoms. As the dissent in Hirschkop pointed out, if the
words of Sheppard were meant to indicate the use of a different standard
when these two interests clash in the attorney comment context, the Court
certainly would have made that point clear. 127 Thus, when these competing
considerations meet, whether in the context of disciplinary rules
prohibiting certain comments or in the context of gag orders prohibiting
certain comments, the Supreme Court's past handling of this issue must be
examined.
One of the early contempt-by-publication cases is Bridges v.
California.1 28 In Bridges, the Supreme Court invalidated a restrictive order
based upon the "reasonable tendency" to impede the fair administration of
justice and applied the stricter "clear and present danger" test.12 9 The
Court has since decided, in Pennekamp v. Florida,'3" Craig v. Harney,"'
and Wood v. Georgia,132 that the contempt power cannot punish speech
unless it poses a clear and present danger to the fair administration of
justice. These cases were recently reaffirmed in Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia.
1 33
It was on these decisions and their recent affirmation in Landmark
Communications that the Goodwin Committee 134 and the dissenting
judges in Hirschkop1 35 based their decision to apply the "clear and present
danger" standard. In view of the overbreadth test proferred in Martinez,
1 36
it appears that restricting comment that would be reasonably likely to
interfere with a fair trial is overbroad, since it would include con-
stitutionally protected speech in its proscription. The Landmark
Communications, Pennekamp, Craig, and Wood decisions indicate that
the Supreme Court has found that the stricter standard of a clear and
present danger will adequately protect fair trial rights without unnecessari-
ly infringing free speech.
B. To What Proceedings Should Attorney
No-Comment Rules Apply?
In addition to determining whether to use per se proscriptions and
what standard to use, it must be decided to what proceedings a court's no-
comment rules should apply. In making this determination, it will be
necessary for courts to examine carefully exactly what interests they are
127. See text accompanying note 85 supra.
128. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
129. Id. at 273. See also Brief for Appellant at 73, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir.
1979) (en banc).
130. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
131. 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
132. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
133. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
134. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
135. See text accompanying note 87 supra.
136. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra.
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attempting to protect and what steps may be taken, within the bounds of
the Constitution, to protect those interests.
1. What Should Be the Scope of the Rules as
They Apply to Criminal Trials?
Most discussion, as well as most agreement, in this area has focused
on the constitutionality of the general application of attorney no-comment
rules to criminal cases, especially those tried by a jury. Criminal trials were
the focus of the Reardon, Kaufman, and Goodwin Committees, other
considerations being beyond the scope of their investigations.137 A
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial has been established as "the most
fundamental of all freedoms"' 38 and is clearly the interest sought to be
protected by the rule as it applies to criminal trials. 39 The controversy
within the criminal trial context has concerned the scope of such a rule.
In Chicago Council of Lawyers, the Seventh Circuit held that during
the investigatory stage, the rules should only apply to prosecuting
attorneys. 40 The Goodwin Report rejected this distinction as "imprac-
tical." 14' The Fourth Circuit did not address this issue in Hirschkop,
although the district court had earlier determined that DR 7-107(A),
regulating comment during the investigatory stage, applies only to
prosecuting attorneys based on a "logical" reading of the provisions. The
district court went on to conclude that the question of the application of
the provision was really of"no constitutional consequence" because "there
are no specific restrictions in DR 7-107(A).', 42 It is true that DR 7-107(A)
does not specifically enumerate what comments are prohibited during the
investigation of a criminal matter. On the contrary, it prohibits a wide
range of comments by allowing only those comments that fit into the five
permissible categories. 43 In effect, should DR 7-107(A) be applicable to
only prosecuting attorneys or to both defense and prosecuting attorneys, it
definitely prohibits a wide range of comment and should be further
examined.
Both the Seventh Circuit and the appellant in Hirschkop pointed out
that, as the rule now stands, it does not even allow a statement that the
individual charged denies any wrongdoing. These two sources also stressed
the need for a societal check on the exercise of the discretion lodged in
137. See GOODWIN REPORT, supra note 43, at 5.
138. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
139. See text accompanying notes 21-23 supra.
140. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
141. See text accompanying note 57 supra.
142. 421 F. Supp. at 1157. See also Brief for Appellees at 28 &29, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d
356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc), which also persuasively opines that DR 7-107(A) applies only to
prosecutors, noting that the language "Lawyer[s] participating in or associated with the investigation
of a criminal matter" is "in stark contrast with the language of the other paragraphs, which refer to 'a
lawyer or lawfirm associated with the prosecution or defense.'"
143. See note I supra.
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prosecutors. 44 Thus, the public's need to know must be weighed against
the protection of the defendant's right to a fair trial. It may be possible, in
examining these competing considerations as related to the investigatory
stage, to determine that the rule should apply only to prosecuting
attorneys. It seems that such a result would accommodate both of these
interests.
Another question relating to the scope of the rules as they apply to
criminal trials has been raised by at least one commentator, although the
courts have not addressed it. This issue relates to the type of criminal
litigation in which the outcome of the trial is not of great personal
consequence to the defendant but the issue itself is of great public concern.
The famous trial of Scopes v. State145 was cited as an example. It has been
suggested that such trials should be subjected to the same analysis as civil
trials. 46 It should be pointed out, however, that the interest sought to be
protected must still be examined; thus, to adopt such reasoning, the court
must be willing to forego protecting that defendant's fair trial rights.
2. Should the Rule Apply to Bench Trials?
One of the most difficult questions concerning the scope of the rules is
whether they should apply to bench as well as to jury trials. The question
arises in the context of both criminal and civil trials, assuming the
applicability of the rules to both. In Hirschkop, the court found the rule to
be overbroad in its application to bench trials. 147 The Goodwin
Committee, acknowledging that a good argument could be made for the
opposite result, nevertheless recommended that the rule continue to apply
to bench trials.
148
Several arguments can be made for applying no-comment rules to
bench trials. It is often not known whether a trial will be decided by ajudge
or a jury until well after prejudicial statements may have been made, so
protective rules may be required because of the possibility of ajury trial. 49
The Fourth Circuit, however, effectively addressed this argument by
limiting its holding to "when it becomes apparent that the case is to be tried
by a judge alone."' 50 The argument relied upon by the Seventh Circuit in
Chicago Council of Lawyers-that "judges are human"-is often made.
Judges may be sensitive to public opinion when they depend upon election
to office. Except for this additional factor, this argument does not carry
144. See text accompanying note 38 supra and Brief for Appellant at 84, Hirschkop v. Snead,
594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
145. 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). In Scopes, the issue was whether the state could
prohibit the teaching of evolution in the classroom.
146. See Wallis, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Professional Ethics and Trial
Publicity: What All the Talk is About, 10 SUFFOLK L. REv. 654, 675 (1976).
147. See text accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
148. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
149. See Brief for Appellees at 30, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
150. 594 F.2d at 371.
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much weight given the role judges must play in hearing evidence to
determine its admissibility. A decision must be made whether this factor
justifies restraints on an attorney's first amendment rights. Should a court
determine that the rules should apply to civil trials, it would then have to
consider these same questions as they relate to civil bench trials.
3. Should the Rules Apply to Civil, Administrative
and Disciplinary Proceedings?
An important consideration in determining the constitutional scope
of no-comment rules is the problem presented by civil trials and
administrative proceedings. The sixth amendment guarantee applies only
to criminal trials. 15' Apparently, the only justification for applying the
rules to civil trials springs from the notion that civil litigants have a strong
interest in the fair administration of justice and from the language in
Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Cox v. Louisiana, which was quoted
in Sheppard: "The very purpose of the court system [is] to adjudicate
controversies, both criminal and civil, in the calmness and solemnity of the
courtroom according to legal procedures." 152 Another justification might
be found in Judge Phillips' concurring opinion in Hirschkop, emphasizing
the state's interest in protecting the "integrity of its judicial processes." 153 It
is doubtful, however, that any of these interests justify placing restrictions
on attorney comment to the extent of DR 7-107(G). 15 4
The unconstitutionality of applying these rules to civil trials is one of
the few points of agreement between the Seventh 155 and the Fourth
15 6
Circuits in their respective decisions. Both courts emphasized the dif-
ferences between civil and criminal trials, primarily the length and the
public concern often involved in civil actions. The arguments of the courts
are persuasive. Once again, but perhaps more crucially than in the
prosecutorial investigations argument, the public's right to know is an
important consideration. Hirschkop, in his brief, listed many types of cases
in which the informed comment of an attorney involved in the case would
be beneficial, if not vital, to the public health or safety: "environmental
protection, . . invasions of privacy by government agencies, ... elec-
tion and ballot cases, antitrust cases, consumer fraud cases, product
liability cases and personal actions based on deprivations of civil rights, to
name but a few."'157 It should be kept in mind, however, that the stakes are
often very high in civil suits and public opinion may still be a prejudicial
factor. Although the need to proscribe attorneys' speech in civil suits may
151. See note 9 supra.
152. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 583 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
153. See note 91 supra.
154. See note 1 supra.
155. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
156. See text accompanying notes 97-99 supra.
157. Brief for Appellant at 67, Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
not be as great as in criminal cases, courts must still be mindful of the
potential for prejudice.
The court in Hirschkop rejected application of no-comment rules to
disciplinary proceedings except in juvenile proceedings before a jury. The
Fourth Circuit's decision that the rules could not apply to professional
disciplinary proceedings and juvenile proceedings before a judge was
based on the same rationale applied to bench trials. This comparison is
sound; thus, the same factors should be considered in determining the
soundness of the court's decision. Because judges are called upon every day
to hear, reject, and oblige themselves not to consider inadmissible
evidence, we must consider them able to disregard publicity surrounding a
case. In a like manner, the Fourth Circuit's holding thatjuvenile jury trials
warrant the protection of the no-comment rule, likening such a proceeding
to a criminal jury trial, is equally sound.15
V. THE ABA's NEW PROPOSED TRIAL PUBLICITY RULE
The American Bar Association's Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards (Katak Commission) released a Discussion Draft
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct on January 30, 1980.159 The
Kutak Commission, which plans to submit a final version of the rules to
the ABA House of Delegates in February 1981, is circulating this draft to
obtain comments and suggestions.
160
Rule 3.8 of the Kutak Report, "Trial Publicity," recommends
substantial changes to DR 7-107,161 reflecting the Commission's
consideration of Hirschkop, Chicago Council of Lawyers, and the
Goodwin Report.
162
A. Qualification of the Specific Prohibitions
Proposed Model Rule 3.8 incorporates the stricter standard of "a
serious and imminent risk of prejudicing an impartial trial."'163 Thus, the
Kutak Report evidences agreement with the standard prescribed by the
Seventh Circuit in Chicago Council of Lawyers, the Goodwin Report, and
the dissenting judges in Hirschkop. 164 Use of the stricter standard would be
a great improvement over DR 7-107. It is consistent with the Supreme
Court's determination, in contempt cases, that such a standard will
adequately protect fair trial rights without unnecessarily infringing free
speech.
165
158. See text accompanying notes 102-06 supra.
159. KUTAK REPORT, supra note 59.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 77-79.
162. Id. at 80.
163. KUTAK REPORT, supra note 59, at 78.
164. See text accompanying notes 134 and 135 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 128-36 supra.
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It is not clear whether the standard in rule 3.8 is meant to qualify all
specific proscriptions. Rule 3.8(a) lists specific extrajudicial statements
that attorneys "shall not ''1 66 make. The "serious and imminent risk"
standard is included at the end of the list, in 3.8(a) (2) (vi), which proscribes
the release of "any other matter that similarly creates a serious and
imminent risk of prejudicing an impartial trial.' 67 The language "any
other matter that similarly" suggests that the standard is meant to qualify
the listed proscriptions so that an extrajudicial comment would violate the
rule only if it fell within one of the specific proscriptions and created a
"serious and imminent risk of prejudicing an impartial trial." This
interpretation would be consistent with the authorities that have examined
the original DR 7-107.168 Interpreting rule 3.8 to disallow any of the listed
comments, regardless of the threat they pose to the specific trial, would be
inconsistent with the authorities discussed earlier that have considered the
question. The language of the rule, however, does not clearly favor either
interpretation. It could be read to apply the standard only to those
comments that are not specifically proscribed. The Commission would be
well-advised to indicate plainly its intention in the rule and in its
comments.1
6 9
This same provision, 3.8(a) (2) (vi), poses a further constitutional
problem, for it proscribes comments that are not specifically listed, but
which create a "serious and imminent risk of prejudicing an impartial
trial." In Hirschkop, the Fourth Circuit declared DR 7-107(D), (G) (5), (H)
(5) and (E) void for vagueness. Like 3.8(a) (2) (vi), those provisions contain
no specific proscription, prohibiting all comments that violate only the
qualifying standard: "other matters that are reasonably likely to interfere
with a fair trial." The Fourth Circuit's objection to these provisions was
that "they deny a'person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity
to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.' ,,70
Although the voided provisions of DR 7-107 are too vague to offer
adequate notice of what is proscribed, that objection may not carry as
much weight when rule 3.8 is tested under the "serious and imminent risk"
standard. An attorney would more likely be able to know what comments
might pose a "serious and imminent risk" than which of a broader class of
comments might be "reasonably likely to interfere" with a fair trial. Thus,
the vagueness risks of rule 3.8 are not so great as with DR 7-107, and rule
3.8 would likely survive such a constitutional challenge.
166. In defining "shall not," the Commission notes: "Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in
the terms 'shall' or 'shall not.' These directly prescribe or limit the lawyer's conduct in performing
professional functions." KtrrAK REPORT, supra note 59, at 4.
167. Id. at 78.
168. See text accompanying notes 114-17 supra.
169. See text accompanying note 52 supra.
170. See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
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B. Scope of the Proposed Rule
Proposed rule 3.8 applies to both criminal and civil litigation,
71
thereby departing from both the Fourth and the Seventh Circuits holding
that DR 7-107 could not constitutionally apply to civil proceedings. Those
opinions emphasized the lack of a constitutional justification for applying
no-comment rules to civil trials and the need for informed public comment
when issues of public concern are involved.17 2 The Kutak Commission
recognized the value of informed public discussion in its comments to rule
3.8, characterizing their rule as "a balance between protecting the right to a
fair trial and safeguarding rights of expression":
[T]here are vital societal interests served by the free dissemination of
information about events having legal consequences and about legal
proceedings themselves. The public has a right to know about threats to its
safety and measures aimed at assuring its security. It also has a profound
legitimate interest in the conduct of judicial proceedings, particularly in
matters of general public concern. Furthermore, the subject matter of legal
proceedings is often of direct significance in debate and deliberation over
questions of public policy.
73
Although the stakes in civil suits are not so high as in criminal trials,
civil litigation can often have serious results. Also, because civil and
criminal juries are composed of the same people, they are equally
susceptible to prejudicial comment. As in some criminal trials, civil suits
may concern issues about which members of the public should be informed
to protect their health or safety. Proposed rule 3.8(b) allows an attorney to
state "without elaboration," among other things, the offense or claim or
defense involved, the general scope of an investigation, and a warning of
danger when there is reason to believe that such danger exists. 174 The
public thus could have access to information up to the point permitted by
rule 3.8(b). In addition, the model rule proscribes other comment only
when it creates a "serious and imminent risk of prejudicing an impartial
trial.' 75 Because less comment would be proscribed by the new rule than
was prohibited by DR 7-107, an attorney would be able, under rule 3.8, to
better inform the public when such a need exists without violating the rule.
Rule 3.8 also embraces, to some degree, the Fourth Circuit's
distinction between bench and jury trials.1 76 The only proscription that
clearly applies to both bench and jury trials, whether civil or criminal, is
3.8(a) (1), prohibiting any extrajudicial statement that is "intended to
induce the tribunal to determine the matter otherwise than in accordance
with law."' 177 Any attorney who, as an officer of the court, intentionally
171. KUTAK REPORT, supra note 59, at 77.
172. See text accompanying notes 155-57 supra.
173. KUTAK REPORT, supra note 59, at 79.
174. Id. at 78.
175. See text accompanying notes 167-69 supra.
176. See text accompanying notes 147-50 supra.
177. KUTAK REPORT, supra note 59, at 77.
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attempts to undermine the integrity of our judicial system should be
subject to disciplinary action. Questions may be raised, however,
regarding the standard for and the burden of proving the attorney's
intention to prejudice the tribunal, especially in the difficult case in which
the comment also serves another purpose.
The remaining prohibitions of 3.8(a) (2) apply only to "a criminal case
or a civil case triable to a jury."'78 Whether these prohibitions are intended
to apply only to cases triable to a jury or to all criminal cases and only civil
cases triable to a jury is not entirely clear. The latter interpretation,
however, seems likely-were "triable to a jury" intended to modify both
types of cases, the preferred phraseology would have been "a criminal or
civil case triable to a jury." As discussed earlier, 179 determining whether
these rules should apply to bench trials is a difficult question. The line
drawn by the proposed rule is a desirable change. In eliminating civil bench
trials from the scope of these prohibitions, the proposed rule reflects the
view that judges must be able to ignore prejudicial information, just as they
must not consider inadmissible evidence, when reaching a decision. Yet, by
applying the prohibitions to criminal bench trials, the proposed rule
reflects the view that "judges are human' and may be subject to political
pressure and, given the high stakes involved in criminal matters, the rule
may proscribe attorneys' comments in such cases on the chance that such a
view may hold true. 180
The final consideration with regard to the proposed rule is 3.8(c),
which reads: "When evidence or information received in or relating to a
proceeding is by law or order of a tribunal to be kept confidential, the
lawyer shall not unlawfully disclose the evidence or information."'' The
comments state: "Paragraph (c) recognizes that special rules of
confidentiality may validly govern proceedings in juvenile,- domestic
relations, and mental disability proceedings, and perhaps other types of
litigation."'182 To state that an attorney may not make comments that
violate the law or an order of the court may be stating the obvious. Rule
3.8(c) makes it plain, however, that an attorney may be subject to
disciplinary action for such a violation.
In light of the authorities discussed above, if rule 3.8 does not allow
the use of per se restrictions without the "serious and imminent risk"
qualification, it reflects a desirable change in the attorney no-comment
rule. Rule 3.8 offers stricter guidelines that should adequately protect trials
from prejudice and make appropriate information available to the public.
Therefore, it is more likely than DR 7-107 to pass constitutional scrutiny.
178. Id. at 77.
179. See text accompanying notes 147-50 supra.
180. See text accompanying note 150 supra.
181. KuTAK REPORT, supra note 59, at 79.
182. Id. at 80.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Hirschkop v. Snead
adds more doubt to the constitutionality of several provisions of DR 7-
107, an ABA disciplinary rule adopted in most jurisdictions and struck
down, in part, by the few courts that have considered it. In light of these
decisions and a new rule being proposed by the Kutak Commission, many
courts will soon be confronted with the task of re-evaluating their present
rule. The authorities that have examined DR 7-107 are not in agreement.
Thus, the results may be varied, leading to greater confusion in this area. It
is likely, however, that courts will be looking toward a rule that does not
restrict attorneys' comments to the extent of the present version of DR 7-
107. The decisions indicate that attorneys' extrajudicial comments may not
be restricted to the extent they have in the past. The public's right to
information, combined with a realistic analysis of an overzealous prior
restriction, is resulting in a reduction in the gag rules needed to ensure fair
trials. Thus, the proposed model rule has incorporated many of the
changes discussed herein and, with some amendments, will provide an
improved guideline in this area. Continued court opinions, however, x'vill
ultimately determine the conclusion to this topic.
Stephanie J. Baker
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